Executive Summary

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has released the Commerce Department's record of China AI chip export licenses application by application. Chairman Brian Mast used his authority under the Export Control Reform Act to publish a single four-page table on 19 November 2026. Each application carries its submission date, the exporter, the receiving party, a chip count and a status. The table, though, is current to 11 May 2026, not to the day it was released. Six months sit in that gap.

Outside the table, the record was summarized as "879,000 approved." Yet all 21 approval rows carry a two-word status: "Approved, not shipped." The column that removed the most chips goes by a different name. It is returned without action, and across the whole table there is exactly one rejection.

The line about 30.9% of approvals belonging to four companies on the Pentagon's Chinese military companies list also deserves a second reading. That list changed four weeks after the table's cutoff date, and it is not a list that gates export licenses in the first place. So read this table to the end and the question changes. From whether the US gave China chips, to what state the number we copied down is in. And whether our own record has a column for that state.

879,868 / 0

Chips approved, and chips shipped among them

As of 11 May 2026. All 21 approvals read 'Approved, not shipped'

1,888,950

Chips cleared out by returned without action

Nine applications. In the same table, rejected chips come to one row of 75,000

272,000 (30.9%)

Share of approvals going to four 1260H-listed firms

The sum approved for Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu and BYD. Not the quantity shipped

16,918 / four rows

Chips and rows dropped by tallies retelling the table

The widely copied company-by-company breakdown runs 14 rows. The original has 18 approval rows

1

What was released is one four-page status table

The document the committee posted is titled "H200 License and Equivalent Application Status as of May 11, 2026." It runs four pages, and every page carries a header beginning "CUI//SP-EXPT." That marking says the pages hold trade secrets protected by law and that further disclosure is barred absent a national-interest determination, and it cites Export Control Reform Act 50 U.S.C. 4820(h)(2) as the basis for that determination. Every page also carries a diagonal "Chairman Mast" watermark. Mast called the release the most detailed disclosure in the history of the Export Control Reform Act.

The same committee has done this before. In October 2021 it released Huawei and SMIC license statistics obtained from the Bureau of Industry and Security. That set covered six months, November 2020 through April 2021, so it runs about as long as this one. What differs is the unit of tally. The earlier release grouped approvals, rejections and returns without action by company, with dollar totals; this one gives every application its own row. Whether the chairman's assessment holds against the full history of the Export Control Reform Act is something this article could not verify. Set against the nearest precedent, though, the unit of tally has plainly dropped one notch, from the company to the application.

Read the date in the title first. The release came on 19 November, but the state the table holds is the state as of 11 May 2026. What happened in the six months since is not in it. That is why every figure this article quotes from the table carries an 11 May tag.

The table has seven columns: date submitted, exporter, data center operator or ultimate consignee, value, chip count, status, and the chips' final location. There are 54 rows, and the chip counts sum to 3,444,160. Reading that number as China's requested volume gets it wrong, though. Mixed into the same table are five rows for data centers in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand totaling 1,118,500 chips, 32.5% of the whole. How those five rows were handled comes up separately in Section 3.

The exporter column names three companies, not two. Alongside Nvidia and AMD, Semsotai USA appears on four rows. All four are applications filed on behalf of Sharetronic Data Technology, for 150, 32,000, 200 and 500 chips, and all four are still under review. Summarize the table as "applications from Nvidia and AMD" and those four rows disappear.

At the foot of the table sits a sentence rather than a row. The Bureau of Industry and Security authorized two licenses covering H200s and other chips for Lenovo, and those authorizations did not extend to sending the chips to Lenovo's facilities inside China. The stated use is building servers outside China and doing research and development on new products such as data center racks. Conditional licenses exist outside the 54 rows too.

1.1Three questions the table does not answer

What is absent matters as much as the arrival of a per-application record. Three questions cannot be answered from this table, and all three are the questions most often asked of it.

What is blank What the table actually shows The question it therefore cannot answer
Value The value column is blacked out on all 54 rows "How large is this deal in dollars?"
Approval date The only date column is the submission date "When was this license approved?"
Chip model Only the exporter is named; there is no model column "Is this row an H200 or an MI325X?"

Source: the four-page table released by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 19 November 2026. What state each of the three columns is in was confirmed by reading the table itself, and what the committee redacted (value) differs in kind from what was never a column at all (approval date, chip model).

The missing third column bites immediately in practice. The chips at issue are two models, Nvidia's H200 and AMD's Instinct MI325X, and the table does not say which row is which. So the sentence "879,868 H200s" does not hold. The 879,868 figure covers both models, and it does not split row by row. Some Korean coverage noted the same thing, that the table does not specify which chip each company applied for.

Nor is the table the whole of the applications. The committee said it holds applications not fully captured here, citing as an example an Nvidia application for 445,000 chips on behalf of Tencent filed on 19 December 2025. The Tencent row in the table with the same date and the same exporter carries a chip count of 75,000. How the two numbers relate is not settled by the public record, so this article will not guess. One thing is certain. 3,444,160 is the sum of this table, not the sum of the applications.

Eleven days earlier the same House sent AI companies a letter asking about their incident reporting, and we recorded our reading of that questionnaire in The House AI Incident Reporting Letter Asks Fourteen Things Every Time. That was a document in which Congress asks; this is one in which Congress releases. Move from the asking side to the releasing side and the reading technique changes with it. With a questionnaire you look at what it did not ask. With a status table you look at what it did not record.

2

Not one of the 21 approvals had left by 11 May

The status column on an approval row holds two words, not one: "Approved, not shipped." Approved, and not yet out the door. There is no exception among the 21. As of 11 May, of the 879,868 chips Commerce had licensed, not a single one had sailed.

This caveat separating approval from shipment is not new. When the 2021 statistics came out, the Bureau of Industry and Security attached the same note, that an approved license does not mean a shipment took place. What has changed is where the note sits. Then it was explanatory text outside the table. Now it is inside the status column, on every row.

The approved chip count and the shipped chip count come from the same 21 rows. Put them on one axis and only one bar has any length.

Same table, same 21 rows, two different numbers Approved 879,868 Shipped 0 As of 11 May 2026 · all 21 approvals read Approved, not shipped

Original Pebblous diagram. It places the chip counts summed across the committee table's 21 approval rows against the shipment volume those same 21 status cells point to. The dashed line on the lower bar is only the shared axis; the bar length is zero. Shipments after 11 May fall outside this table.

Why did nothing leave? The usual account looks only at the American side. Three stages are in fact stacked in sequence, and the middle one sits in China. The US issued the licenses, China did not clear the chips into the mainland, and then Nvidia stopped shipping.

China has tied H200 imports to case-by-case approval from the National Development and Reform Commission. Reuters reported that roughly 600,000 chips were waiting in Hong Kong as of 5 November. The volume that reached the mainland is far smaller. The Financial Times reported that as of August, ByteDance and Tencent had each taken delivery of about 10,000. And an Nvidia spokesperson, John Rizzo, said this.

"The review and licensing process spanned more than half a year, with approvals subject to strict conditions and limited volumes. Despite receiving some licenses, we have since stopped shipping H200s to China."

There is confirmation at the company level too. Colette Kress, the acting chief executive, said on the 17 November earnings call that Nvidia is no longer shipping licensed Hopper data center products to China. The license was granted, the receiving side did not receive, and the sending side stopped.

2.1Three ledgers report three different states for the same chips

This is where the subject of this article becomes concrete. Three public records cover the same chips, and the three give different answers. All three are sourced and all three are true.

Ledger The state that ledger reports As of
Committee status table 879,868 approved, 0 shipped 2026-05-11
Nvidia income statement $2.4B in licensed Hopper shipments to China Quarter ended 2026-10-25
Mainland delivery reporting About 10,000 each to ByteDance and Tencent; some 600,000 waiting in Hong Kong 2026-08 / 2026-11-05

Sources: the House Foreign Affairs Committee table, Nvidia's FY2027 Q3 results materials, and Financial Times and Reuters reporting. The three rows are not three figures for one date but three figures for three different cutoffs, and what each counts differs as well: decisions, revenue recognition, and mainland arrival.

Read these three as a contradiction and one of them has to go. Yet none of them does. The cutoffs differ and the objects counted differ. One counts decisions, one counts revenue recognition, one counts mainland arrival. It is tempting here to convert $2.4 billion into a number of chips, but that calculation is one we will not do. We could not confirm unit prices from a primary source, and a converted figure quickly circulates as though it were a number from one of the other ledgers.

A share works better than a conversion for placing the figure. Nvidia's total revenue in the same quarter was $115.8 billion, and $2.4 billion is 2.1% of that. The 9.5% figure circulating alongside it is computed against the quarter's entire China and Hong Kong revenue, which mixes in products that have nothing to do with the licensed items.

Back in October we read Tencent's deal to rent AI chips from Oracle in When Tencent Rents AI Chips From Oracle, Where Does the Data Go?. That was a route for renting compute beyond the border without a license; this is a route where the license came through properly and the chips did not. Set the two pieces side by side and it becomes clear that one column called the export license cannot explain how compute gets procured.

3

The column that removed the most chips is returned without action

Four words go in the status column: approved, returned without action (RWA), submitted, and rejected. Split those four by application count and by chip count, and you can see why the two words used outside do not summarize this table.

Status (as written) Applications Chips Share of total requested
Approved, not shipped 21 879,868 25.5%
Returned without action (RWA) 9 1,888,950 54.8%
Submitted (under review) 23 600,342 17.4%
Rejected 1 75,000 2.2%
Total 54 3,444,160 100%

Source: the 54 rows of the House Foreign Affairs Committee table, summed by status. The two cells marked in orange indicate that the leader by application count (23 under review) and the leader by chip count (1,888,950 returned without action) are different columns. The "50 applications in total" figure some Korean coverage used does not match the original row count.

There is one rejection. It is AMD's application for 75,000 chips on behalf of UCloud, 2.2% of the total requested. The nine applications returned without action, by contrast, come to 1,888,950 chips, 54.8% of the whole. So the summary "more than half were rejected" gets the number right and the name wrong. A return without action is less a decision reached at the end of review than a handling that sends the application back untouched, and the applicant can revise and refile. The legal character of that disposition is not something the public record settles, so this article goes no further with it.

3.1The largest approved row is 75,000 chips

Split the 21 approvals by exporter and you get Nvidia with 17 applications for 579,868 chips and AMD with four for 300,000. AMD cut all eight of the applications it has in the table into blocks of 75,000, and exactly half of them were approved.

Across the 21 approvals the maximum chip count is 75,000, and nine rows land on exactly that number. Conversely, not one row in the table above 75,000 was approved. The five largest rows look like this.

Receiving party (date submitted) Chips Status Location
Alibaba Group (2026-02-06) 610,000 Returned without action China
Bytedance System SDN BHD (2025-12-11) 508,000 Returned without action Malaysia
PT Byteplus Technologies Indonesia (2025-12-13) 203,000 Returned without action Indonesia
Alibaba Cloud (2025-12-15) 203,000 Returned without action Malaysia
TikTok (System) Thailand (2025-12-19) 154,000 Returned without action Thailand

Source: the House Foreign Affairs Committee table. The five largest rows by chip count are reproduced as written, and all five carry returned without action in the status column. Other rows in the table exceed 75,000 beyond these five, and none of those entered the approved column either.

The Southeast Asian volume sits in the same place. Three Malaysian rows at 761,500 chips, one Indonesian row at 203,000 and one Thai row at 154,000 make five rows totaling 1,118,500 chips, every one of them returned without action. Two things stand out. First, all five belong either to ByteDance (865,000) or to Alibaba (253,500). Second, the volume sent back from Southeast Asia exceeds the 879,868 chips approved for China.

Take Alibaba alone and the ratio sharpens. What it received approval for is a single row of 75,000 chips located in China; what came back is 873,950. Of 948,950 chips requested, the share granted is 7.9%. AI Times wrote "75,000 approved out of 950,000 requested," and that matches the original table.

Ask for an approval rate and there are two answers. By chip count it is 25.5%; by application count it is 38.9%. There is no need to draw out the contrast. Stacy Rasgon of Bernstein made the same point to CNBC more briefly.

"It doesn't sound to me like they're approving everything they got willy nilly. There was a process in place, and it sounds like they approved about one out of every four." / "In the grand context of the size of this market and how much they're shipping, it's a rounding error. It's tiny."

His one in four sits all but exactly on the chip-count rate, and neither unit of measure disturbs his reading. Whether you count chips or applications, a process was in place and the volume stays small against the market.

One comparison remains. In the 2021 release, Huawei was approved on 113 of 169 applications and SMIC on 188 of 206. For SMIC that is 91.3% by application count. On the Huawei side the number widely quoted is 69.3%, and its denominator is not the 169 applications but the 163 on which approval, rejection or return without action had all been completed. Put every application in the denominator and it comes to 66.9%. Even inside one dataset, how far you draw the denominator moves the approval rate this much. The items, the review policy and the period all differ, so the two datasets cannot be stacked to read that controls have tightened, and this article goes only as far as placing the two numbers side by side.

4

Four companies got 272,000 chips, and the list changed afterward

The most widely quoted figure from this release is 272,000. It is the sum approved for the four companies the Pentagon has designated as Chinese military companies, 30.9% of the 879,868 total approved. It breaks down as 150,000 for Tencent, 75,000 for Alibaba, 43,000 for Baidu and 4,000 for BYD. Add the four and you get exactly 272,000.

A scope note belongs here. "Tencent received the most" is true only within these four companies. Across the whole table, ByteDance was approved for the same 150,000 chips for its China-based entity, and next comes DiDi at 99,780. Carry a ranking drawn from only the four 1260H-listed firms over to the table as a whole and those two rows disappear.

What follows is this section's substance. Three of the four companies joined that list after the decisions' cutoff date. Line up the designations and the decisions in time and it looks like this.

Date What happened
2025-01 Tencent is added to the 1260H list. It stays listed thereafter, and Tencent has said it will contest the designation
2025-12-09 The earliest submission date in the table. Applications begin arriving
2026-02-13 The Pentagon posts an updated list to the Federal Register, then withdraws it about an hour later. That version had added Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, WuXi AppTec, RoboSense and Qihoo 360
2026-05-11 The cutoff date of the license status table
2026-06-08 The update is published again. Alibaba, Baidu, BYD, TP-Link and others are added, bringing the list to 188 entities
2026-11-19 The committee releases the status table

Sources: Federal Register 1260H designation notices, the House Foreign Affairs Committee table, and law firm commentary. The 13 February 2026 version was pulled shortly after posting and never took effect, and license review was running throughout those four months.

This article is not the first to count that gap. Bloomberg flagged it the day of the release, noting that Tencent had been on the list since January of last year while the other three were formally added in June, so Alibaba, Baidu and BYD were licensed before they were designated. Korean coverage carried the same point that day. It cannot be narrowed further, though. With no approval-date column in the table, when each license was granted cannot be pinned down beyond "before 11 May," which is why this article does not offer a sum such as "122,000 chips fell outside the list at the time of decision."

1260H designations vs. the license table's cutoff, in order 2025-01 Tencent listed 2025-12-09 First filing received 2026-02-13 Update withdrawn 2026-05-11 License table cutoff 2026-06-08 3 more listed 2026-11-19 Committee releases table

Pebblous original diagram. Built from Federal Register 1260H designation notices and the House Foreign Affairs Committee table. Only Tencent was on the list before the cutoff (11 May 2026); Alibaba, Baidu and BYD were added four weeks later, on 8 June. The 13 February version was withdrawn shortly after posting and never took effect.

The grounds for designation are worth noting as well. For Alibaba, Baidu and BYD, the Pentagon cited indirect ties to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and contributions to military-civil fusion through Ministry of Industry and Information Technology programs. Alibaba responded that the listing "does not affect our ability to conduct business as usual in the United States or anywhere else in the world."

One point should be stated plainly. Receiving a license is not itself a violation. Under a January 2026 rule, Commerce replaced a presumption of denial with case-by-case review, reviewed these applications individually, and the applicants cleared that process — which is all this table records. Settling whether anything was violated starts with asking which regime actually attaches to this review.

5

The Pentagon's 1260H list puts no license on exports

So what does the 1260H list block? The Pentagon's Chinese military companies list was created by Section 1260H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act. It is an identification and reporting list through which the Department sorts out companies it judges to be linked to the Chinese military and reports them to Congress, and listing alone triggers neither sanctions nor an export ban. The actual force comes from other provisions. Under Section 805 of the FY2024 NDAA, a ban on direct Pentagon contracts takes effect on 30 June 2026 and a ban on indirect procurement on 30 June 2027. What it aims at is the Pentagon's wallet, not the export review window.

The machinery that puts a license on exports sits elsewhere, at Commerce. Landing on the Entity List means a BIS license is required to send items subject to the Export Administration Regulations, and the review policy is usually a presumption of denial. The military end-user rule requires a license for transfers to specified military uses and users. Those two hold the actual window.

This distinction is not our reading; it is what law firm commentary records consistently. Of five such notes, four take up the reach of the designation and the fifth takes up its practical weight.

Commentary The point it makes
Akin Gump 1260H listing carries no current legal effect in itself. No independent legal consequence arises unless the entity also appears on another restricted list
Crowell Section 1260H does not itself impose any prohibition
King & Wood Mallesons It imposes no licensing requirement, but it raises diligence obligations and drives counterparties to avoid the business
Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer It does not prohibit directly, but it is being folded into procurement restrictions and compliance regimes, and its weight is growing
Dentons BIS treats 1260H listing as a military end-user red flag and expects added diligence before transferring items subject to the EAR

Source: five law firm notes published between June and July 2026. The first four record that 1260H's legal effect is limited; the last records that it nonetheless triggers diligence in export review. The two sides do not conflict.

So reading the sentence "licenses went to designated companies" as a violation folds two regimes into one. At the same time, reading 1260H as an entirely harmless tag is not accurate either. If BIS treats it as a red flag, the intensity of review changes in practice. As far as we could confirm, these four companies are not on the Commerce Entity List that puts a license on exports. That is a confirmation of an absence, though, so we record it without asserting it.

5.1Whether the review went through interagency consultation is disputed

This is where the sharpest split opened right after the release. Commerce said the licensing decisions were the product of deliberation and consultation across multiple US government agencies. On the other side is Chris McGuire, senior fellow for China and emerging technology at the Council on Foreign Relations. Citing reporting by The Information, he said Commerce approved the licenses over objections from the State Department, the Energy Department and the Pentagon, and that Commerce claimed the interagency review requirement did not apply to the H200. That second claim is an account passed through secondhand reporting, so this article carries it only as far as "he said." Rather than merging the two statements, we leave both standing.

Back in August we read a case in which a Pentagon supply-chain risk designation was overturned in federal court, in A Federal Court Struck Down Anthropic's Supply-Chain Risk Designation. There the force of a designation was cut down in court; here the force of a designation never reaches this procedure to begin with. The same word, designation, keeps a different distance in each regime. Eight days ago, in A Blacklisted Chinese University Buys Nvidia H200 Chips, and Rents More, which went through a sanctioned Chinese university's procurement notices, the instrument that actually had force was the Entity List.

6

Four rows and 16,918 chips vanished in the retelling

Start with what held. Coverage on the day of the release and the day after largely preserved the status words. CNBC used "approved" in its headline, and Reuters-sourced pieces carried a caveat in the body that the figure represents export approvals rather than confirmed deliveries. Bloomberg wrote it out in a sentence: none of the chips approved as of 11 May had shipped. Korean headlines split between "export permit" and "export approval" without sliding into "sent," and several carried the not-shipped notation in the body. Korean articles also picked up the 1260H designation gap. So the summary "the press got it wrong" does not come out of this material.

Four places slipped even so. All four can be pinpointed, and the first is provable by arithmetic.

6.1Four rows fell out of the widely copied breakdown

From the day after the release, a 14-row company-by-company breakdown ran in several places. Those 14 rows sum to 862,950, while the approval total is 879,868. The difference is 16,918. One could have read that difference as the original table being incomplete. Add the original's 21 approval rows directly and that reading does not hold. The sum is exactly 879,868, and what fell out was not the table but the tally retelling it. The four missing rows are these.

Missing row (as written) Chips
Ubiquant Investment (Beijing) Co., Ltd. 8,660
Shanghai Yovole Cloud Computing Co., Ltd. 4,250
Shanghai Jiatang 4,000
Nvidia (filed on its own behalf) 8
Total 16,918

Source: a row-by-row comparison of the widely copied 14-row company breakdown against the original House Foreign Affairs Committee table. The four rows sum to exactly the difference between the two totals. The number of companies approved is 18, not 14.

Look at the size of the rows that dropped and a pattern appears. The smallest is eight chips. When a table gets retold, the small rows go first, and the fact that they went is written down nowhere until someone adds the total again. The 16,918 chips are under 2% of the whole, but they also mean four companies disappear from the list entirely.

6.2The other three are places where one word changed

Second, a universal loosened into a partial. In the table, all 21 approvals are unshipped, while some Korean coverage rendered it as "a significant number of approvals marked as not shipped." "All" and "a significant number" leave a reader with different pictures.

Third, in commentary, approved turned into shipped. McGuire's statement ran in several outlets like this.

"The fact that over 30% of the AI chips sent to China were shipped to companies that the Department of War has designated as Chinese military companies is astonishing, and calls into question whether Commerce conducted any serious national security review before approving these licenses."

On the same material, the table's status column says not shipped while the commentary says sent and shipped. Whatever the merits of the criticism, this is a case of the status word shifting to the stronger term at the point where a figure gets picked up. Fourth, the number got rounded. The 879,868 traveled as "880,000," "900,000" and "nearly 900,000." That is four digits erased, not one.

One quotation also changed hands. Several tallies attributed to Chairman Mast the statement that BIS failed to enforce its own rules and that Congress must exercise rigorous oversight, while CNBC's original attributes it to ranking Democrat Gregory Meeks. Merge a Republican chairman's words with a Democratic ranking member's into one person's and you erase what each party took issue with in the same material.

Put the four together and they make one sentence. Move a record that carries state into a number that carries none, and state is the first thing to go. What makes this release valuable is not the size of the figures but the per-application status written beside them. That column is what let us separate approval from shipment, and it is what let us confirm four missing rows by adding the total again.

7

Why Pebblous Cares

When Pebblous takes in a record, the first question is not how large the value is but what state the value is in. This table is a textbook for that question. One number, 879,868, is both the quantity approved and the quantity that has not moved at all.

7.1Drop one column and two meanings fold into one

Strip out the status column and approved becomes the same word as secured. What this article confirmed is that the fold actually happened. Four rows fell out of the tallies retelling the table, and one of them was eight chips. The same column exists in the ledger of anyone procuring AI infrastructure. Contract signature, purchase order, delivery, installation and go-live are five different dates, and writing all five into one column breaks capacity planning.

7.2Align the cutoff dates before overlaying two tables

The sentence "30.9% of approvals went to Pentagon-designated companies" is built by overlaying two tables. One is a license status table current to 11 May; the other is a designation list dated 8 June. The cutoffs are four weeks apart, and three of the four overlapping companies came in with the later version. This is not a question of ideology but a question of join conditions. Which cutoff do you use? And ahead of that sits a more basic question. Do the two tables' keys mean the same thing? One side's designation blocks procurement; the other side's license opens an export. Similar names do not make them the same object. On top of that, this table has no approval-date column at all. When you want to join and the column to join on does not exist, the honest thing to say is that you do not know, not to substitute a cutoff date for it.

7.3For procurement and supply, it comes to four questions

If your organization procures or supplies AI infrastructure, the useful move is to hold this release up against your own ledger.

  • In our supply ledger, does "secured" mean contracted, ordered or delivered? Are we writing all three into one column?
  • Which agency's restricted list do we use, and which version? Do we record the version date with it? Does its scope actually overlap our procurement route?
  • When we overlay two lists, do we align the cutoff dates? Are we judging past transactions against today's version?
  • When we publish a figure externally, do we publish the state with it? Are we leaving room for the recipient to read approved as secured?

None of the four can be reconstructed later if it is not written down at the time of recording.

7.4A column for state can only be built while collecting

Pebblous belongs not on the side arguing which country is right but on the side that keeps state and cutoff date sitting next to the number. In Korea too, more and more bodies are tallying and publishing compute infrastructure figures. Send out a bare number and the outside world will read it in its strongest sense, the way "approved" was read as "sent" in this table. And at that point the status column cannot be bolted on after the fact. It can only be built at the moment the record is made.

R

References

The figures in the body start from the four-page table the committee released, and the statuses and chip counts across all 54 rows were taken from it and re-added. The character of the 1260H list and its effective dates come from statute and law firm commentary; actual shipments and the volume held in Hong Kong from wire reporting; Nvidia's shipping halt from the company itself. The formal title and Federal Register number of the January 2026 rule, and the legal character of a return without action, could not be confirmed from primary sources, so the body does not assert either.

Primary — Congress and government

  • 1.U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "H200 License and Equivalent Application Status as of May 11, 2026." 4-page PDF, released 19 November 2026. Released document
  • 2.U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Chairman Brian Mast Exercises Legislative Authority to Publicly Release AI Chip License Information for China." Press release, 19 November 2026.
  • 3.Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. 4820(h)(2) — the provision underpinning the disclosure authority.
  • 4.FY2021 NDAA Section 1260H and FY2024 NDAA Section 805 — the character of the list and the effective dates of the procurement bans (direct 30 June 2026, indirect 30 June 2027).
  • 5.Federal Register 1260H designation notices — the January 2025 version, the version posted and withdrawn on 13 February 2026, and the 8 June 2026 version (188 entities).

Primary — Company disclosures

  • 6.NVIDIA. FY2027 Q3 results materials (quarter ended 25 October 2026) and CFO commentary, 17 November 2026 — $2.4B in licensed Hopper shipments to China, $115.8B total revenue, $11.05B China and Hong Kong revenue, and the statement on halting shipments.

Secondary — Press

  • 7.Papp, J. & Tarasov, K. "Commerce approved sales of more than 879,000 AI chips to Chinese companies, Rep. Mast says." CNBC, 19 November 2026 — the Meeks and Mast statements, Rasgon's commentary, and the Nvidia spokesperson's verbatim quote.
  • 8.Bloomberg. "US Approved AI Chip Sales to China's Tencent, Alibaba, Data Show." 19 November 2026 — the 1260H designation gap and the statement that nothing had shipped as of 11 May.
  • 9.Reuters. "US signed off on sales of nearly 900,000 AI chips to China in six months, House committee says." 19 November 2026 — the caveat distinguishing approval from delivery.
  • 10.Reuters. Report on roughly 600,000 H200s held in Hong Kong, 5 November 2026.
  • 11.Financial Times. Report on deliveries of about 10,000 chips each to ByteDance and Tencent, August 2026.
  • 12.Park Chan. "US Commerce licensed AI chip exports to firms tied to the Chinese military; House disclosure draws scrutiny." AI Times, 20 November 2026 — 75,000 chips approved out of Alibaba's 950,000 requested.
  • 13.Quartz. "The U.S. has let Nvidia and AMD sell hundreds of thousands of AI chips to China." qz.com, 19 November 2026.
  • 14.Korean coverage including Money Today, Digital Today and The Korea Times, 20–21 November 2026 — used to compare status wording in headlines against body text.

Quasi-primary — Legal commentary

  • 15.Akin Gump. "DoD Updates Section 1260H List of Chinese Military Companies." June 2026.
  • 16.Dentons. "DoD Expands Section 1260H 'Chinese Military Companies' List." 18 June 2026 — the statement that BIS treats 1260H listing as a military end-user red flag.
  • 17.Crowell, King & Wood Mallesons, and Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer. Commentary on the effect of 1260H, June–July 2026.
  • 18.Foley Hoag. "BIS Releases Statistics on Export Licenses to Huawei and SMIC." 22 October 2021, with Export Compliance Daily coverage the same day — Huawei approved on 113 of 169 and SMIC on 188 of 206 between November 2020 and April 2021, plus the BIS caveat of the time that an approved license does not mean a shipment took place.

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