This article summarizes columns by Kim Ho-jun, CEO of Ditto ESG. The Pebblous Data Communication Team condensed four guest columns he wrote for the opinion pages of the Korean daily Etoday between December 2025 and October 2026. The arguments in sections 1 to 4 are his; section 5 is a Pebblous editorial on the role of AI and data in next-generation corporate governance. Links to the original Korean columns are in the Original columns section at the end.
Executive Summary
A stewardship code sets out how institutional investors that manage other people's money, such as pension funds and asset managers, should act for the long-term value of the companies they invest in. Korea adopted its code in 2016, and 249 institutions have signed it. Across four columns, Kim keeps returning to one question: is signing and disclosing enough, or what did investors actually do, and what changed?
In his view, the direction is clear. The reform package announced at the end of 2025 widens compliance checks over three years starting in 2026, and requires institutions to disclose their activities and results every year rather than simply having a policy. Value-Up disclosures have also spread fast, but more disclosure does not by itself raise corporate value. So the last column asks to change the question itself: not whether an investor joined the code, but whether it could show its activities and results if its client arrived for due diligence tomorrow.
Kim describes this as one of two pillars of capital market reform. Three rounds of Commercial Act amendments have reshaped the corporate side; now a four-year roadmap turns to strengthening the role of institutional investors. The four columns cover that second pillar.
Korea's Stewardship Code in numbers
The numbers in the columns show a code that has grown in reach, while the tools to check what it achieves are only now being built.
249
Signatories to the code
As of end-December 2025. The code has not been revised once since 2016
22
Countries with a code
From 2010 through the end of 2025
7 · 12
Principles and activities checked
Institutions disclose what they did and its results each year, not just a policy
2026–2028
Phased expansion of checks
From asset managers and pension funds to private equity, insurers, brokers and banks
Those entrusted must account
Original: "Seeking a 'reasonable balance' in the Stewardship Code," Etoday, December 31, 2025
The first column opens with the Parable of the Talents. Before leaving, a master entrusts his property to his servants, and on his return he asks how they managed it. The two who grew the money are praised; the one who buried it is rebuked and loses even what he was given. Kim reads three elements of stewardship in the story: the one who entrusts asks for an account, holds the steward responsible for results, and then reduces, withdraws or increases the assets entrusted.
A stewardship code asks the same of institutional investors. Institutions holding clients' money should act as faithful stewards and engage actively for the long-term value of the companies they invest in. When a problem arises at a company, doing nothing or staying silent is itself a breach of that responsibility. The Korean government is also pushing to revitalize the code, with the aim of raising the value of investee companies and of the capital market as a whole.
Kim compares Korea with the United Kingdom and Japan. In the UK the financial regulator has led the code, and in Japan the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the world's second-largest pension fund with about 2,300 trillion won under management, has led it; both countries have revised their codes several times. Korea has not revised its code once since 2016. Signatories have grown to 249, but no one has checked whether they actually carried out stewardship activities or whether those activities worked. In his diagnosis, the code's effectiveness depends on how far regulators and public pension funds take the lead, whether the code keeps being monitored and revised, and how rigorously compliance is checked.
His prescription is "constructive engagement" and a "reasonable balance." Investor engagement should actually lift companies' value and trust, and it should serve the interest of the whole, not of any one party among companies, investors, the capital market and society.
Compliance checks and joint engagement
Original: "Shall minority shareholders join forces for Value-Up?" Etoday, February 24, 2026
The second column explains the reform package for the code that Korean authorities announced together at the end of 2025. Its aim is to make the code effective and bring it up to global standards. The biggest change is a timetable that gradually widens who is subject to compliance checks and stronger disclosure.
- 2026: asset managers and pension funds
- 2027: private equity fund managers (PEF) and insurers
- 2028: securities firms, banks and investment advisers, plus venture capital (VC) and service providers
The checks look at whether each institution actually carried out the 12 activities under the code's 7 principles. Signatories can no longer stop at adopting and disclosing a policy; they must carry out matching activities and disclose the results every year. Kim expects this to have a sizable effect on companies with outside investors and on the capital market as a whole.
The "minority shareholders joining forces" in the title refers to collective engagement. The UK and Japan actively encourage investors to engage together to cut the resources and costs of engagement and improve its results. If Korea's large-shareholding disclosure rules are reformed to match advanced markets, institutions will be able to voice views on shareholder meeting agendas or specific issues jointly. As Kim puts it, minority shareholders who once said they had no power to speak up could at any moment start saying, let's pool our strength for corporate value.
There are two ways to run compliance checks. One lets the market police itself, in keeping with the code's nature as soft law; the other has the regulator supervise compliance directly and make it mandatory. Both are being discussed in Korea. In February 2026, a bill amending the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies was introduced that would let the Financial Supervisory Service supervise compliance every year. Kim grants that self-regulation lightens the burden on the market and can absorb a range of best practices, but argues that it only works if checks backed by strong capital, such as those of pension funds, actually operate in the market.
Value-Up needs strategy, not a plan
Original: "Value-Up should go beyond plans to 'strategy'," Etoday, June 23, 2026 (Diagnosis and Proposal)
The third column starts from the Korea Exchange's 2026 white paper on the corporate value-up program. Value-up plan disclosures, fully launched in May 2024, have spread quickly. Companies began diagnosing their position and setting targets around shareholder returns, capital efficiency and growth, and shareholder returns such as cash dividends and share buybacks and cancellations were the most visible change. As value-up indices and related products have grown, they have started to shape market benchmarks and capital allocation.
Kim warns, however, that more disclosure does not by itself raise corporate value. What matters is not the quantity of disclosures but the quality of strategy. He borrows a distinction from the strategist Roger Martin. A plan is a to-do list of budgets, assigned tasks and progress checks. A strategy is an integrated set of choices to reach a desired result, including what not to do. If activities do not connect and do not add up to a value-creation logic the market finds convincing, they remain a plan.
The Japanese exemplars he cites are not the companies that raised dividends or buybacks the most. They are companies whose boards keep reviewing the cost of capital, reshape the business portfolio, set clear capital allocation principles and refine how they talk to shareholders. The models were not the companies with the most plans but the ones that built a system the market could trust.
So Kim offers questions a listed company should ask itself before publishing a value-up plan.
- Why is the market discounting us: low profitability, weak growth, inefficient capital allocation, or a lack of trust in our governance and shareholder communication?
- Does our board discuss the business portfolio and capital policy against the cost of capital?
Many companies still trade below a price-to-book ratio (PBR) of 1, meaning the market values them below their book net assets, which is evidence that the Korean market's discount has not been resolved. For Kim, Value-Up is not a disclosure obligation but a strategic question the capital market puts to companies. For listed companies it is a task for closing the discount; for institutional investors it is a language for finding companies with large untapped value.
The era of proof
Original: "The Stewardship Code enters an era of proof," Etoday, October 7, 2026
The fourth column argues that Korea's Stewardship Code has entered a new stage. Where participation used to be what mattered, what matters now is what an investor actually did, what changed, and how convincingly it can show this. Kim points to the National Pension Service as the signal. It used to score external asset managers with extra points for adopting the code, having guidelines or publishing responsible-investment reports; now it plans to assess their stewardship activities qualitatively and tie the results to future allocations or withdrawals of funds. Stewardship is becoming part of investment capability rather than a job for the ESG team.
Japan's GPIF is already a step ahead. Rather than counting meetings with companies, it asks whether engagement fit the investment strategy, whether it had goals and milestones, and whether the company's behavior or decisions actually changed. Kim proposes presenting engagement as a story rather than a count: what issue was found, what the dialogue aimed for, how the company responded and what changed afterward, told as one value story. In his words, ten cases with clear goals, follow-up and results show a manager's capability better than a hundred company meetings.
To that end he calls for "financializing" stewardship: explaining, in the language of corporate value, how governance and ESG issues affect revenue, costs, capital expenditure, risk, capital allocation and the cost of capital, and how that feeds into corporate value and investment decisions.
Demanding more of asset managers alone will not make the system work, he adds. He lists four tasks for a new stewardship ecosystem.
- Safeguards to control conflicts of interest and keep voting independent at asset managers owned by financial groups or business conglomerates
- Dedicated funds or mandate fees that cover the cost of active engagement, such as specialist staff, research, data and legal review
- Detailed guidelines on joint holding and large-shareholding reporting when collective engagement turns into joint voting
- A fresh look at voting and engagement practice as passive funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) grow
Kim closes by changing the question. Not whether an investor joined the code, but whether it could confidently show its stewardship activities and results if its client came for due diligence tomorrow. Fiduciary capitalism that benefits everyone, he writes, starts not with a declaration but with evidence.
Next-generation governance will run on AI and data
This section is not a summary of the columns but an editorial by the Pebblous Data Communication Team. It is not Kim's argument.
In Kim's framing, Commercial Act reform that moves companies is one pillar, and stewardship reform that moves institutional investors is the other. Read side by side, the four columns written over ten months show where that second pillar is heading. The first sets the principle that those entrusted must account; the second turns that account into a compliance-check regime; the third applies the same logic to corporate value-up; and the fourth raises the bar for the account to evidence. The question moves from "did you join, did you disclose" to "what did you do, and what changed."
5.1The scale of proof is beyond human hands
Evidence comes from records. If no one kept track of when an issue was spotted, who discussed what with whom, and how the company responded, a value story becomes a narrative assembled after the fact. Yet the system the columns describe multiplies the records. Compliance checks will reach securities firms and banks by 2028, and every institution will disclose the results of 12 activities under 7 principles each year. As passive funds and ETFs grow, a single asset manager may have to vote at hundreds of companies. Reading every investee's disclosures and meeting agendas, logging engagement and then weaving the results into a convincing account is more than people alone can handle.
What Kim calls "financializing" stewardship, translating governance and ESG issues into the language of revenue, costs and the cost of capital, is ultimately data work: joining scattered disclosures, financials and engagement records and explaining how they relate. The corporate side is no different. A board cannot review its business portfolio against the cost of capital without numbers it can trust. We believe next-generation corporate governance will work this way, with AI helping to read, connect and explain.
5.2AI-built evidence is only as good as its data
But evidence assembled by AI is only as trustworthy as the data beneath it. Figures of unknown origin, misread disclosures and ESG scores built on different standards turn a value story into a plausible wrong answer. For a fiduciary to prove something to its client, or a company to the market, it must show not only the conclusion but where the underlying data came from and how it was handled. Proving stewardship leads to the same question as proving data.
That is why Pebblous is paying attention to these columns. Pebblous works on diagnosing the quality of the data AI relies on and recording its lineage. If governance comes to run on AI and data, asking whether the data at the bottom can be trusted becomes part of governance itself. We want to prepare for the era of proof starting from that question.
Original columns
All four are guest columns by Kim Ho-jun, CEO of Ditto ESG, in the opinion pages of Etoday. The full Korean texts are available on Etoday.
- 1.Kim, Ho-jun. (2025). "[기고] 스튜어드십코드 '합리적 균형' 찾길" (Seeking a 'reasonable balance' in the Stewardship Code). Etoday, 2025-12-31.
- 2.Kim, Ho-jun. (2026). "[기고] "밸류업 위해 소액주주 연대할까요"" (Shall minority shareholders join forces for Value-Up?). Etoday, 2026-02-24.
- 3.Kim, Ho-jun. (2026). "[진단과 제언] 밸류업, 계획 넘어 '전략'으로 추진해야" (Value-Up should go beyond plans to 'strategy'). Etoday, 2026-06-23.
- 4.Kim, Ho-jun. (2026). "[기고] 스튜어드십코드, 이제 증명의 시대로" (The Stewardship Code enters an era of proof). Etoday, 2026-10-07.